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INTRODUCTION
In the year and a half since their introduction, Opportunity Zones have quickly become one of the hottest 
topics in real estate development. This exciting program offers a new chance to revitalize distressed 
communities around the country by significantly broadening the pool of potential investors and 
providing them with enticing incentives to pull their money out of the market and into these locales. The 
success or failure of the program will hinge on the ability of public-private partnerships to bridge an 
often fraught line between outside investment and local community. In addition to providing an overview 
of the Opportunity Zone Program, this article examines the history of these partnerships in New Orleans 
and identifies the areas of the city that may benefit most from a new, aggressive approach to bringing in 
previously untapped resources to meet the needs of local residents. 
the initial stipulation that it was necessary for QOFs to have 
90 percent of their assets invested in qualified Opportunity 
Zone property within 180 days.  Given the uncertain 
nature of timing in the development of either operational 
businesses or real estate, many investors were wary of 
being able to meet this requirement, however the proposed 
IRS regulations apply working-capital safe harbor rules 
that contemplate allowing a QOF up to 30 months after 
acquiring a tangible asset in which to improve that asset 
substantially (IRS–Proposed OZ Guidelines).  Although the 
program’s eligible investments include existing businesses 
and startups, it is uniquely tailored to appeal to those in the 
real estate industry.
Opportunity Zones are not unique in the sense that the 
United States, at both the federal and state level, has 
designed numerous programs over the last several 
decades intended to boost investment in economically 
distressed communities.  Critics of the program contend 
that Opportunity Zones are just another tax incentive that 
will not do much to move the needle of investment in these 
underserved communities.  Other incentives, such as New 
Market and Low Income Housing Tax Credits (NMTC and 
LIHTC, respectively) have been in place for years with mixed 
success.  Additionally, many of the communities designated 
as Opportunity Zones have been neighborhoods in close 
proximity to areas that have seen considerable investment 
and are already themselves in the process of transitioning. 
How, the critics ask, will the residents of these zones be 
able to remain in place and be able to partake in the upside 
in the face of significant outside investments that may 
increase property values and rents to unsustainable levels? 
The answer is not completely clear.  Opportunity Zones are 
at the intersection of one of the country’s foremost cultural, 
political, and economic challenges:  how to bring new 
investment to distressed areas without entirely displacing 
or excluding existing residents.   
OPPORTUNITY ZONES: AN OVERVIEW
Created by the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Opportunity 
Zones have attracted a tremendous amount of interest 
since their introduction.  Designed to spur investment 
in distressed communities across the country, the tax 
incentive program called on the top officials in each state 
and territory to designate low income census tracts that 
best presented opportunities to increase investment and 
economic prospects.  By providing benefits in a similar 
fashion to a 1031 exchange, the program allows investors, 
upon the sale of an asset, 180 days to re-invest the capital 
gain proceeds (not including the original basis) into a 
Qualified Opportunity Fund (“QOF”) that in turn must invest 
these funds into Qualified Opportunity Zones.  These 
zones, numbering over 8,700 census tracts that have been 
certified by the United States Department of the Treasury, 
present a unique opportunity that would allow investors to 
take advantage of the estimated $6 trillion in unrealized 
capital gains held in the U.S. market and to guide these 
funds into some of the most economically depressed areas 
of the country.  If investments of QOFs are held for at least 
five years, the basis on the original gain is increased by 10 
percent.  If the same investment is held for at least seven 
years that percentage increases to 15 percent.  Investments 
held longer than ten years will be eligible to be marked up 
to the fair market value of such investment on the date 
the investment is sold.  Essentially, this amounts to an 
exclusion of capital gains taxes on any gains earned from 
an investment in a QOF over ten years when the investment 
is sold or disposed. 
While the rules are not yet finalized, in October 2018 
the IRS released a set of proposed regulations guiding 
investments in QOFs that have begun to allow the overall 
process to take shape and have provided encouragement 
to investors.  For instance, investors were concerned with 
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INVESTORS RISING TO THE CHALLENGE
Doubts about the viability of the program and the lack of 
finalized regulations has not tempered the enthusiasm 
of the real estate community.  According to the National 
Council of State Housing Agencies (NCSHA), as of 
February approximately $24 billion has been raised by 105 
Qualified Opportunity Funds. Of these funds, ninety percent 
intend to focus on commercial real estate investments. 
Encouragingly, approximately half of the funds intend to 
focus on community revitalization, including affordable 
housing or workforce housing. While the NCSHA offers a 
fairly comprehensive view of existing funds, the broadness 
of the proposed regulations allow for individuals to create 
QOFs supporting individual projects.  As regulations 
continue to take shape and are finalized and investors 
become more comfortable with the process, more funds 
should be created. 
The enormous potential of Opportunity Zones lies in the 
unrestricted cap on the amount of capital that can be 
invested through a QOF.  Even if a small portion of the 
trillions of dollars’ worth of unrealized capital gains flow 
into these funds, the size of investment will dwarf that of 
programs with similar goals, such as the LIHTC program, 
which allocates funds to state housing finance agencies 
based on population. The process of awarding funds through 
this program is complex and lengthy, requiring coordination 
across federal and state levels.  The level of sophistication 
naturally limits the willing participants in the market and is 
estimated to cost the government approximately $9.0 billion 
annually. No such limits currently apply to those willing to 
invest in QOFs.  The potential of investors in stocks, bonds, 
and other asset classes to make long term real estate 
investments, while deferring or altogether foregoing taxable 
gains, opens up a broad and diverse pool of capital that has 
clearly demonstrated a willingness to attack the massive 
problem of housing affordability. 
The challenge facing investors in Opportunity Zones is the 
learning curve associated with investments in distressed 
communities that in most instances over the last several 
decades have consistently seen these types of efforts fail to 
meet expectations. The real estate development landscape 
during this time has constantly shifted and expanded. 
The number of “stakeholders” in the development of any 
major project (and many minor ones) has multiplied as the 
world has become a more open and global place.  The 
activist culture that grew out of the Civil Rights and peace 
movements of the 1960s manifested itself in local advocacy 
groups and grassroots neighborhood organizations that hold 
wide ranging beliefs and push specific agendas, leading 
to a much more fractured and complicated development 
process.  Coupled with the fact that Americans have 
become increasingly less likely to chase opportunity and 
jobs outside of their natural birthplace (a characteristic that 
defined the country for much of its history), neighborhoods 
have developed distinct identities and senses of place that 
these groups seek to maintain.  As a result, the ultimate 
success or failure of Opportunity Zone Funds will depend 
upon their ability to balance the needs and demands of the 
local community with overall investment goals and targeted 
returns required by investors.  Fortunately, a framework for 
this type of engagement already exists. 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS 
Over the same time period that saw the emergence of a 
plethora of local advocacy groups, the U.S. has developed 
a wide ranging framework of entities whose stated goal 
is to foster community building and guide funds into such 
distressed areas. These entities, be they community 
development corporations (CDCs), community land trusts 
(CLTs), local economic development corporations, or 
similarly structured organizations collectively have a mixed 
track record at successfully bridging the gap.  Of these 
various organizations, the CDC is most suited to the task 
of serving as an intermediary between the emerging QOFs, 
the local community, and local government. 
A community development corporation is comprehensively 
defined as “a nonprofit, community based urban 
development organization that engages in economic 
development activities such as housing production, 
commercial property development, business development, 
and/or job creating for the benefit of community residents” 
(Krigman, 2010). The model seeks to bring local leaders 
concerned with community building and well-being together 
with a professional service staff capable of working with 
both the private sector and government to bring investment 
into under-served communities.  They emerged in the 
1960s and ‘70s when local activists made the decision to 
embrace an approach rooted more in capitalistic traditions 
than protest (Scally, 2012).  This approach allowed CDCs 
to gain significant funding from a variety of federal, state, 
and philanthropic sources as they have grown into one of 
the largest providers of affordable housing in the country. 
An estimated 4,600 CDCs exist in some form or another 
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today (Varady, Kleinhans, & van Ham, 2015).  The large 
majority of these organizations have little funding and small 
staffs.  They have developed a broad range of services 
such as homeowner counseling or budget/credit counseling 
to go along with a “high level of sophistication in packaging 
financing from multiple sources and savvy in dealing with 
other neighborhood organizations, local government, and 
intermediaries” (Varady, Kleinhans, & van Ham, 2015). 
This last skill is particularly important considering local 
engagement will be a critical component of any real estate 
development pursued by QOFs. 
Critics of the Opportunity Zone program contend that funds 
will only flow to projects that would have already been 
financially viable or were on the brink of financial viability. 
While this observation is undoubtedly true, the sheer 
number of potential zones and the demonstrated interest of 
investors suggests that, once these first targeted deals are 
engaged, the opportunity exists for investment to overflow 
into other zones.  Investors will be willing to make larger 
investments and pursue projects in new areas – provided 
they have the buy-in of the local community and the proper 
economic incentives to bridge the gaps that will inevitably 
exist.  This area is precisely where CDCs, with their unique 
blend of community roots and financial capabilities, should 
be able to step in and meet this need.  Perhaps no city 
presents a greater opportunity than New Orleans. 
NEW ORLEANS’ PRE AND POST KATRINA DYNAMICS
Internationally recognized for both its dynamic history and 
cuisine, New Orleans is one of the most culturally rich and 
diverse cities in the United States.  Drawing from French, 
Spanish, Creole, and Caribbean influences, among others, 
the city has developed an unrivaled mixture of architecture, 
food, and music that draws an enormous number of 
visitors each year.  The local population is intensely proud 
of this culture and is heavily invested in maintaining it, a 
fact underscored by census data that shows Louisiana 
contains the highest percentage of native born residents in 
the country (Aisch & Gebeloff, 2014). While residents and 
visitors alike revel in the unique and vibrant lifestyle the city 
affords, significant challenges exist–some unique to New 
Orleans and others similar to trends across the country. 
Like many cities in the country, New Orleans is struggling 
mightily with the problem of housing affordability.  According 
to HousingNOLA, a broad local coalition of public and private 
housing interests, New Orleans is in need of approximately 
33,600 units of affordable housing over the next ten years 
(HousingNOLA, 2015).  While New Orleans boasts one 
of the largest and busiest ports in United States, for most 
of the last forty years the economy has revolved largely 
around tourism.  The city has developed nascent industries 
that include technology, healthcare, and aerospace, but 
there has simply not been enough activity to close the ever 
widening income gaps that exist. 
Much of the problem is due to loss in the core income-
producing population.  Since its peak at 627,525 in the 1960 
census, the city saw its residency decline by over twenty 
percent by 2000 to 484,668.  This population loss was driven 
by the development of surrounding parishes through the 
draining of swampland to accommodate suburban housing, 
the construction of the Pontchartrain Expressway, Interstate 
10, and Veterans Memorial Highway.  By the 1970s over 
forty percent of the metropolitan area population resided 
outside of the city.  A significant portion of this population 
was middle to upper income residents, further draining the 
tax base of the city (Lowe & Bates, 2013).  The oil crisis 
of the 1980s all but sealed the fate of the local economy 
as most of the remaining oil and gas companies fled to 
Houston as that city surpassed New Orleans as the energy 
hub of the country.  This disinvestment, coupled with the 
corrupt nature of Louisiana politics, led to a city that was in 
decline well before Hurricane Katrina wreaked havoc on the 
Gulf Coast Region in 2005. 
Although various non-profit and philanthropic organizations 
operated in the city during this period, it was not until the 
1990s that the problems of vacancy and blight caused 
by population loss were recognized and there were no 
community-based organizations engaging in any type 
of scaled affordable housing or real estate development 
(Lowe & Bates, 2013).  Some twenty years after 
community development corporations had established 
themselves nationally, encouraged by Mayor Marc Morial’s 
administration, several new CDCs emerged locally to rise 
to the task of redeveloping these blighted areas.  Led by 
a newly formed local development partnership called the 
New Orleans Neighborhood Development Collaborative 
(NONDC), by 2000 nine CDCs had developed 625 housing 
units. 
Throughout this progress, however, many of the same 
conflicts inherent in the growth of CDCs throughout the 
country also challenged the capacity of New Orleans 
organizations. CDCs exist in a constant state of tension 
brought about by competing interests.  Local grassroots 
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activists expect a CDC to use its capacity to promote the 
social well-being of local residents and empower them to 
take control of their own communities, a goal that is not 
easy to define (Knotts, 2006). On the other hand, the private 
philanthropic interests that provided most of the funding (in 
addition to federal Community Block Development Grants) 
expected to see quantifiable gains in areas such as housing 
and job programs.  These challenges lead to issues in gaining 
the support of the numerous and separate neighborhood 
organizations whose buy-in is crucial to the success of 
any potential development.  After the initial successes that 
led to positive gains in affordable housing, moving into the 
new millennium support for CDCs in New Orleans waned 
as national organizations pulled funds in pursuit of other 
goals and the NONDC changed its focus from a community 
partnership that brought together organizations across the 
city to a real estate developer focused exclusively on the 
Central City Neighborhood (Lowe & Bates, 2013). In the 
years leading up to Hurricane Katrina little was done at the 
community level to further affordable housing development 
and progress stagnated. 
Hurricane Katrina, which impacted New Orleans and the Gulf 
Coast Region in August of 2005, forever altered the city’s 
future.  The five years prior had seen the City’s population 
continue to shrink; the estimated pre-Katrina population in 
2005 was 452,170, down from 484,668 in 2000.  The extent 
of the damage varied greatly by neighborhood and generally 
favored the City’s original historic footprint built along high 
ground near the Mississippi River.  These areas, in addition 
to the entire West bank of the city, were largely spared.  Still, 
over eighty percent of the City flooded, damaging 134,000 
housing units – roughly 70 percent of the occupied housing 
stock at the time. 
The first five years after the storm were a crucial period in 
shaping how the city would respond, however disorganization 
in the distribution of recovery funds and lack of a true all-
encompassing redevelopment strategy held back progress. 
Plans were proposed by Mayor Ray Nagin’s Bring New 
Orleans Back Commission (BNOBC), the City Council (the 
New Orleans Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan – NONRP), 
and private philanthropic sources (Unified New Orleans 
Plan - UNOP).  Each plan varied widely and in some cases 
were completely contradictory, with the BNOBC plan calling 
for almost an entirely redrawn map clustering development 
in key areas, the NONRP putting redevelopment decisions 
into the hands of individual neighborhood residents and 
ensuring the return of every pre-Katrina neighborhood, 
and the UNOP plan following a middle road, proposing a 
clustering of remaining residents and businesses within 
each specific neighborhood.  All three plans, including an 
additional two provided by the community, were adopted—
without reconciliation—as the official recovery plan by both 
the New Orleans City Council and the Louisiana Recovery 
Authority (Ehrenfeucht & Nelson, 2013).  The result was an 
uneven distribution of population and resources that were 
stretched across a city that, despite a shrinking population, 
increased its developable footprint from 36.8 square miles 
in 1960 to 66.7 square miles in 2000.  Today, New Orleans’ 
population stands at 393,292, approximately 86 percent of 
it’s pre-Katrina population. 
DOWNTOWN’S RESURGENCE
Despite the lack of a unified direction, Downtown New 
Orleans and many of its surrounding neighborhoods have 
witnessed an unprecedented surge of investment over the 
course of the last decade. As the rest of the country plunged 
into recession in the aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis, 
New Orleans had already hit bottom in the wake of Katrina. 
Taking advantage of generous state and federal historic 
rehabilitation tax credits, developers began converting many 
of the existing buildings in the Downtown and Warehouse 
district areas into condominiums and apartment buildings, 
doubling the number of units in the market transforming 
the area into a 24/7 residential hub.  The approximately 
$6.5 billion in investment over the prior decade has 
expanded options across Downtown.  Projects such as the 
Domain Companies’ South Market District, a $500 million 
Figure 1.  A view of the World Trade Center. The building is currently 
being renovated into a Four Seasons Hotel. Source: Wiki Images.
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project consisting of nearly 1,000 luxury apartments and 
condominiums, 200,000 square feet of retail space, and a 
40,000 square foot luxury grocer, have forever altered the 
landscape of the city.  Currently underway is the $450 million 
re-development of the New Orleans World Trade Center 
into a Four Seasons hotel and condominium property. 
Charity Hospital, which was at one time the second oldest 
and second largest free hospital in the United States prior 
to being closed after Hurricane Katrina, is in the midst of a 
$250 million re-development process that could further add 
another major source of market-rate and affordable housing 
to the stock. 
While the scope and scale of these developments have 
been impressive, much of the increase in supply during this 
period is attributable to hotel rooms catering to the ever-
dominating tourism industry and higher end apartments 
and condominiums.  This momentum has not carried over 
to the problem of affordable housing and in many instances 
has exacerbated it.  Prior to the storm much of the city’s 
lowest income residents were housed in one of five large 
public housing sites:  B.W. Cooper, C.J. Peete, Lafitte, St. 
Bernard, and Iberville.  Collectively these sites accounted for 
approximately 6,000 units of affordable housing.  Due to the 
irreparable damage done to these buildings by the storm, in 
addition to the fact that they had become a constant source of 
crime and disruption, a decision was made to demolish them 
in favor of new, lower density mixed-income developments. 
These efforts have succeeded in decentralizing poverty but 
at the loss of thousands of affordable units closer to the 
city core.  The former residents instead rely on voucher 
programs to use for private residences.  Community groups 
Figure 2.  An aerial view of Mid-City New Orleans. Opportunity Zone locations are outlined in black. Source: Google Earth.
Figure 4.  A far aerial view of New Orleans Opportunity Zones. Source: 
Google Earth.
Figure 3.  A close aerial view of New Orleans Opportunity Zones. 
Source: Google Earth.
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and developers have had modest success in building single-
family affordable homes on the thousands of blighted lots 
that checker the city, with demand far outstripping supply. 
This continuing imbalance reinforces the fact that more 
large-scale affordable residential development is needed. 
The Opportunity Zone program, if properly used, presents 
this kind of chance for New Orleans.
NEW ORLEANS’ OPPORTUNITY
In reviewing the areas of New Orleans that have been 
designated as Opportunity Zones, the city appears to be 
well positioned.  Of the 23 designated Opportunity Zones 
in New Orleans, 16 are in neighborhoods within a 5-10 
minute drive time of Downtown New Orleans.  The biggest 
impediment to development in these areas, however, is 
that the majority of these neighborhoods are typical to New 
Orleans:  low density single family homes with scattered 
small multi-family apartments.  There are simply not many 
contiguous development parcels that would support a 
large scale development project.  In hindsight, in the years 
immediately following Katrina, had the City been able 
to effectively “right-size” at least some areas in order to 
open up areas for future growth, the potential for massed 
investment through the Opportunity Zone Program would 
be much greater.  For obvious and legitimate political and 
socio-economic reasons, however, this was not a viable 
option (Ehrenfeucht & Nelson, 2013).  Despite these 
challenges, a significant opportunity does exist in the four 
zones that cover a significant portion of the Mid-City Area 
of New Orleans. 
Much like the majority of neighborhoods, the Mid-City area 
of New Orleans suffered significant flood damage due to 
Hurricane Katrina. Although a majority of the district is 
residential in nature, its area directly Northwest of Downtown 
New Orleans and the French Quarter have seen a surge of 
investment in the last three years. Two major investments 
changed the course of this area. First, the $2 billion 
construction of the University Medical Center and Veterans 
Affairs hospitals permanently altered the trajectory of the 
neighborhood.  Built on approximately 70 acres of land that 
was expropriated from a historic district, the controversial 
project was completed in 2015 and has dramatically shifted 
investor sentiment on both the Tulane Avenue and Canal 
Street corridors, bringing in thousands of full time jobs in 
the medical and bio-medical industries.  Further to the 
Northeast, the second project, the Lafitte Greenway, also 
opened in 2015.  A city sponsored project, an old railroad 
right of way was repurposed into 2.6 miles of bicycle and 
pedestrian trails, athletic courts, playgrounds, and green 
space that connects the French Quarter with the Bayou St. 
John neighborhood, one of the cultural bastions of Mid-City. 
Considering their location close to the tourist hub of the 
downtown area, the areas surrounding these projects are 
ripe for further development that could take advantage of 
opportunity zone locations to the benefit of local residents. 
The project has spurred significant investment and 
development along the entire greenway and, at a cost of 
$9.1 million, is a testament to the ability of municipalities to 
foster economic growth with little up-front investment.   
Despite the disarray with which it pursued recovery in the 
years immediately following Katrina, in 2010 New Orleans 
took a major step forward with the adoption of a Master 
Plan.  Up until that point in its history the city had relied on 
a hodgepodge of local zoning ordinances that did not give 
much thought to any over-arching, long-term idea of what 
the city might be.  Most recently updated in 2015, the Master 
Plan, while not ground-breaking by any means, provides an 
in-depth view of the future potential for development.  Most 
encouragingly, it seeks to embrace high-density mixed use 
developments, identifying ten “opportunity sites” across the 
city that have the potential for such projects and indicating 
that the city would be willing to work with interested 
developers in pursuit of these goals.  
Only one of these sites, a 6 acre parcel of land called 
Poydras Row, is located within the Mid-City Area and 
also in an Opportunity Zone. The city’s call for action from 
developers should be noted, however, for this is where the 
intersection of Opportunity Zone investors and CDC’s can 
come together to find creative development solutions across 
the board. Poydras Row is not the only potential developable 
site in the Mid-City Opportunity Zone area.  Large portions 
of Mid-City are industrial in nature or are surface parking for 
the hospitals and medical school.  Tulane Avenue itself has 
many sites that are ripe for re-development, although surging 
land prices around the hospitals may preclude affordable 
housing. The City’s willingness to identify opportunity sites 
and open the door for development suggests an inclination 
to help make these denser projects a reality through 
various creative means. CDCs, in addition to the numerous 
other public/private organizations in New Orleans such as 
HousingNOLA, Greater New Orleans, Inc., and Friends of 
Lafitte Greenway have a unique opening to work with local 
stakeholders and match potential sites with QOFs. 
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The immense interest and attention the Opportunity Zone 
Program has received since its inception is well-deserved. 
The program has great potential to transform some of the 
country’s most historically down-trodden areas. As the 
regulations are finalized in the coming months more investors 
will continue to come to the table. The long term success or 
failure of the program rests in the ability of public-private 
partnerships to bring all stakeholders together and match 
incentives to investment with the needs of the community. 
New Orleans, having made significant progress in the last 
three years, is poised for future growth. Opportunity zones, 
if worked correctly, present a chance to bring this growth to 
all members of the community. 
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